网页内容摘要

本网页是一篇学术论文《Self-actualization Myths: What did Maslow Really Say?》(自我实现的误区：马斯洛到底说了什么?)，作者是William C. Compton教授。文章旨在澄清关于马斯洛自我实现理论的常见误解。论文指出，尽管马斯洛的自我实现理论在心理学和公众中广为人知，但经常被误解或曲解。作者使用马斯洛自己的著作来反驳这些误区，涉及的主题包括：理论的实证支持、需求层次的组成和发展过程、自我实现中"自我"的含义、理论中隐含的精英主义，以及自我实现者的幸福感。文章还讨论了马斯洛自我实现理论对当代心理学的相关性。论文详细列举了几个关于自我实现理论的误区，并通过引用马斯洛原著来澄清这些误解，包括关于需求层次理论的实证支持、需求满足的百分比问题、认知和审美需求在需求层次中的位置，以及自我实现者是否只关注自身发展等问题。

与探究问题相关的信息

关于"马斯洛是否在《动机与人格》中明确指出'自我实现是所有人类行为的最终目标'"这一问题，网页内容中有几处相关信息：

1. 文章第4个误区部分明确讨论了关于自我实现者的焦点问题。马斯洛试图反驳"自我实现是非常以自我为中心的个人成长过程"这一假设。他在《动机与人格》(1954年版)中指出："[自我实现的人]是已经发展或正在发展到他们能够达到的充分状态的人。这些潜能可能是特异性的，也可能是物种范围内的，因此自我实现中的'自我'不应该有太强的个人主义色彩。"

2. 马斯洛描述高度自我实现的人时，经常描述以他人为中心和人道主义关怀为导向的态度和行为。他借用了阿德勒的亲社会构念"社会兴趣"或"社会感"，并将其作为高度自我实现者15个特征之一。

3. 马斯洛(1971)还说，高度自我实现的人是"元动机"的，或者说是被"存在价值"所驱动，而不是追求名声、财富、影响力或自尊。他们不是在寻求"普通公民"的"基本需求满足"，而是"成为自己，发展，成长，成熟，不是去任何地方(例如，社会攀登的意义上)，不是在普通意义上努力和尝试达到与他们所处状态不同的状态。"

4. 马斯洛还指出："也许动机的普通概念应该只适用于非自我实现者。我们的研究对象不再以普通意义上努力，而是发展...对他们来说，动机只是性格成长，性格表达，成熟和发展..."

这些信息表明，马斯洛并没有在《动机与人格》中明确指出"自我实现是所有人类行为的最终目标"。相反，他强调自我实现是一个复杂的过程，涉及个人成长、对他人的关怀和更广泛的人道主义价值观，而不仅仅是个人成就或自我发展的终点。马斯洛实际上区分了"普通动机"和"元动机"，认为自我实现者的动机与普通人不同，更多地体现为性格成长和发展，而非追求特定目标。

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摘要

《动机与人格》是亚伯拉罕·马斯洛于1954年首次出版的心理学著作，1970年进行了修订。本书旨在扩展对人类人格的理解，强调人类具有"更高层次的本性"，这种本性是本能性的，是人类本质的一部分。马斯洛试图建立一种整体论的、人本主义的心理学观点，这与当时流行的行为主义和弗洛伊德精神分析学的机械论、原子论方法形成对比。

书中最核心的内容是第3-7章提出的需求层次理论，该理论最初于1942年提出，试图整合弗洛伊德、阿德勒、荣格等人的部分真理。马斯洛认为，人类基本需求具有本能性质，构成了内在价值体系的基础。这些需求不仅是人们想要的，也是避免疾病和心理病理所必需的。

在修订版序言中，马斯洛指出，他的理论已经从一个心理学内部的争论发展成为一种新的"人本主义"世界观，这种观点对抗着当时知识界普遍存在的绝望和犬儒主义。他强调，人类向上成长、自我实现的倾向必须被接受为普遍存在的人类趋势，同时也承认人类具有退行、恐惧的倾向。马斯洛还提出了"满足的病理学"概念，指出基本需求的满足并不自动带来持久的幸福。

与问题相关的信息提取

在《动机与人格》第四章"人类动机理论"中，马斯洛对"自我实现"的定义和讨论是本书的核心内容之一。根据网页内容，我们可以看到第四章的标题是"A Theory of Human Motivation"（人类动机理论），位于第35页开始。

然而，在提供的网页内容中，我们只能看到目录和序言部分，而没有第四章的实际内容。序言中提到马斯洛的动机理论在第3至7章中有所呈现，并且这一理论最初是在1942年提出的，试图整合弗洛伊德、阿德勒、荣格等人的部分真理。

序言中马斯洛提到了"自我实现"(self-actualization)的概念，将其描述为人类的"向上成长"(striving "upward")倾向之一，与"追求健康"、"寻求身份认同和自主"、"追求卓越"等概念并列。他指出这些必须被接受为"广泛存在的、也许是普遍的人类倾向"。

关于是否明确指出"自我实现是所有人类行为的最终目标"这一问题，在提供的网页内容中没有直接证据。相反，马斯洛在序言中提出了一个更为复杂的观点：人类不仅有向上成长的倾向，也有"退行、恐惧、自我缩减"的倾向。他还讨论了"满足的病理学"，指出基本需求的满足并不自动带来持久的幸福或价值体系。这表明马斯洛的观点更为微妙，可能并不支持将自我实现简单地视为"所有人类行为的最终目标"。

值得注意的是，马斯洛在序言中提到了需求的层次性，以及"元需求"(metaneeds)的概念，这些可能与自我实现相关，但要获得更确切的定义和论述，需要查看第四章的实际内容，而这在当前提供的网页内容中是缺失的。

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摘要

《动机与人格》是亚伯拉罕·马斯洛于1954年首次出版、1970年修订的心理学著作。本书试图通过探索人类"更高层次"的本性来扩展对人格的理解，提出了一个全新的人性观。马斯洛认为，除了当时主流心理学所描述的人性外，人类还拥有一种本能性的"更高层次"的本性。

书中最核心的内容是马斯洛的需求层次理论，最初于1942年提出，试图整合弗洛伊德、阿德勒、荣格等人的理论。这一理论在临床和社会层面取得了成功，但缺乏实验验证。马斯洛将基本需求视为人类内在价值体系的基础，认为这些需求不仅是人们所渴望的，也是避免疾病和心理病理所必需的。

马斯洛在修订版序言中指出，他的理论已发展成为一种更广泛的"人本主义"世界观，不仅适用于心理学，还适用于经济学、社会学等多个领域。他反对那些认为人性本质邪恶的悲观观点，强调人类具有向上成长、自我实现的普遍倾向，同时也承认人类存在退行、恐惧等消极倾向。马斯洛还提出了"满足的病理学"概念，指出基本需求的满足并不自动带来持久的幸福，人类对永恒幸福的希望可能永远无法实现。

与问题相关的信息提取

在《动机与人格》这本书中，马斯洛对"自我实现"的定义主要出现在第11章"自我实现的人：心理健康的研究"(Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health)中。虽然在目录中可以看到这一章的存在，但在提供的网页内容中并没有展示该章节的具体内容，因此无法直接从当前材料中提取马斯洛对自我实现的完整定义。

然而，从序言部分可以获取一些相关线索。马斯洛提到他的理论关注"成长、自我实现、追求健康、对身份和自主性的探索、对卓越的渴望"，并称这些是"广泛存在且可能是普遍的人类倾向"("Growth, self-actualization, the striving toward health, the quest for identity and autonomy, the yearning for excellence... must by now be accepted beyond question as a widespread and perhaps universal human tendency")。

关于"自我实现是所有人类行为的最终目标"这一说法，在提供的内容中没有找到马斯洛明确作出这样的断言。相反，马斯洛在序言中提出了一个更为复杂的人类动机观。他指出人类不仅有向上成长的倾向，也有"退行、恐惧、自我贬低的倾向"("regressive, fearful, self-diminishing tendencies")。他还提到人们对自己最好的可能性既爱又怕("we are afraid of our own best possibilities in addition to loving them")，表明人类动机是复杂且矛盾的。

马斯洛还提出了需求层次理论，将人类需求分为基本需求和元需求(metaneeds)，并将它们视为内在价值体系的基础。这表明他认为人类行为有多种动机，而不仅仅是自我实现一种最终目标。

总之，从提供的材料中，无法确认马斯洛是否明确指出"自我实现是所有人类行为的最终目标"，反而有证据表明他的观点更为复杂，承认人类动机的多样性和矛盾性。

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ABRAHAM H.MASLOW

MOTIVATION

AND

PERSONALITY

Copyright © 1954 by Harper & Row,Publishers, Inc.

Copyright © 1970 by Abraham H. Maslow

Reprinted from the English Edition by Harper & Row, Publishers 1954

This book was made possible

by the generosity of my brothers

Harold, Paul, and Lew

of the Universal Container Corporation

CONTENTS

fREFACE

ix

1. A Psychological Approach to Science

1

2. Problem Centering vs. Means Centering in Science

11

3.

Preface to Motivation Theory

19

4.

A Theory of Human Motivation

35

5. The Role of Basic Need Gratification in Psychological Theory

59

6.

The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs

77

7.

Higher and Lower Needs

97

8.

Psychopathogenesis and the Theory of Threat

105

9.

Is Destructiveness Instinctoid?

117

10. The Expressive Component of Behavior

131

I I. Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health

149

12.

Love in Self-Actualizing People

181

U.

Cognition of the Individual and of the Generic

203

14. Unmotivated and Purposeless Reactions

229

15.

Psychotherapy, Health, and Motivation

241

16.

Normality, Health, and Values

265

Appendix A: Problems Generated by a Positive Approach to

Psychology

281

.

Appendix B: Holistic-Dynamics, Organismic Theory. Syndrome

Dynamics

295

BI8L1OGRAPHY

329

INDEX OF NAMES

355

Il\'DEX OF SUUJECTS

360

vii

IPI~IEIFACIE

I have tried in this revision to incorporate the main lessons of the last

sixteen years. These lessons have been considerable. I consider it a real

and extensive revision-even though I had to do only a moderate amount

of rewriting-because the main thrust of the book has been modified in

important ways which I shall detail below.

When this book appeared in 1954 it was essentially an effort to build

upon the classical psychologies available rather than to repudiate them or

to establish another rival psychology. It attempted to enlarge our con-

ception of the human personality by reaching into the "higher" levels of

human nature. (The title I had first planned to use for the book was

Higher Ceilings for Human Nature.) If I had had to condense the thesis

of this book into a single sentence, I would have said that, in addition to

what the psychologies of the time had to say about human nature, man

also had a higher nature and that this was instinctoid, i.e., part of his

essence. And if I could have had a second sentence, I would have stressed

the profoundly holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the

analytic-dissecting-atomistic-Newtonian approach of the behaviorisms

and of Freudian psychoanalysis.

Or to say it another way, I certainly accepted and built upon the

available data of experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. I accepted

also the empirical and experimental spirit of the one, and the unmasking

and depth-probing of the other, while yet rejecting the images of man

ix

x

Preface

which they generated. That is, this book represented a different philoso-

phy of human nature, a new image of man.

However, what I took then to be an argument within the family of

psychologists has in my opinion turned out since then to be rather a local

manifestation of a new Zeitgeist, a new general comprehensive philosophy

of life. This new "humanistic" Weltanschauung see~s to be a new and

far more hopeful and encouraging way of conceiving any and every area

of human knowledge: e.g., economics, sociology, biology, and every pro-

fession: e.g., law, politics, medicine, and all of the social institutions:

e.g., the family, education, religion, etc. I have acted upon this personal

conviction in revising this book, writing into the psychology presented

herein, the belief that it is an aspect of a much broader world view and

of a comprehensive life-philosophy, which is already partly worked out,

at least to the point of plausibility, and must, therefore, be taken seriously.

I must say a word about the irritating fact that this veritable revolution

(a new image of man, of society, of nature, of science, of ultimate values,

of philosophy, etc., etc.) is still almost completely overlooked by much of

the intellectual community, especially that portion of it that controls the

channels of communication to the educated public and to youth. (For this

reason I have taken to calling it the Unnoticed Revolution.)

Many members of this community propound an outlook characterized

by a profound despair and cynicism which sometimes degene:-atesinto

corrosive malice and cruelty. In effect they deny the possibility of im- '

proving human nature and society, or of discovering intrinsic human

values, or of being life-loving in general.

Doubting the realness of honesty, of kindness, of generosity, of

affection, they go beyond a reasonable skepticism or a withholding of

judgment into an active hostility when confronted by people whom they

sneer at as fools,"Boy Scouts," squares, innocents, do-gooders, or Polly-

annas. This active debunking, hating and rending goes beyond contempt;

it sometimes looks like an outraged counterattack against what they

consider to be an insulting effort to fool them, to take them in, to pull

their legs. The psychoanalyst would, I think, see in it a dynamics of rage

and revenge for past disappointments and disillusionments.

This subculture of despair, this "more corrosive than thou" attitude,

this counter-morality in which predation and hopelessness are real amI

good will is not, is flatly contradicted by the humanistic psychologies.

and by the kind of preliminary data presented in this book and in many

of the writings listed in the Bibliography. While it is still necessary to he

very cautious about affirming the preconditions for "goodness" in human

Preface

xi

nature (see Chapters 7, 9, II, 16), it is already possible to reject firmly the

despairing belief that human nature is ultimately and basically depraved

and evil. Such a belief is no longer a matter of taste merely. It can now

be maintained only by a determined blindness and ignorance, by a re-

fusal to consider the facts. It must therefore be considered to be a per-

sonal projection rather than a reasoned philosophical or scientific position.

The humanistic and holistic conceptions of science presented in the first

two chapters and in Appendix B have been powerfully corroborated by

many developments of the past decade, but especially by Michael Po-

lanyi's great book Personal Knowledge (376). My own book, The Psy-

chology of Science (292), carries forward very similar theses. These books

are in blunt contradiction to the classical, conventional philosophy of

science still too widely prevalent, and they offer a far better substitute

for scientific work with persons.

The book is holistic throughout, but a more intensive and perhaps

more difficult treatment is contained in Appendix B. Holism is obviously

true-after all, the cosmos is one and interrelated; any society is one and

, interrelated; any person is one and interrelated, etc.-and yet the holistic

outlook h~s a hard time being implemented and being used as it should

be, as a way of looking at the world. Recently I have become more and

more inclined to think that the atomistic way of thinking is a form of

mild psychopathology, or is at least one aspect of the syndrome of cog-

nitive immaturity. The holistic way of thinking and seeing seems to

come quite naturally and automatically to healthier,

self-actualizing

people, and seems to be· extraordinarily difficult for less evolved, less

mature, less healthy people. To date this is only an impression, of course,

and I do not want to push it too hard. Yet I feel justified in presenting

it here as a hypothesis to be checked, something which should be rela-

tively easy to do.

The motivation theory presented in Chapters 3 throllgh 7, and to

some extent throughout the book, has had an interesting hist.ory. First

presented in 1!)42 to a psychoanalytic society, it was an effort to integrate

into a single theoretical structure the partial truths I saw in Freud, Adler,

Jung, D. M. Levy, Fromm, Horney, and Goldstein. I had learned from

my own scattered experiences in therapy that each of these writers was

correct at various times 'and for various persons. My question was essen-

tially the clinical one:

which earlier deprivations produce neurosis?

Which psychological medicines cure neurosis? Which prophylaxis pre-

vents neurosis? In which order are the psychological medicines demanded?

Which are most powerful? Which most basic?

xii

Preface

It is fair to say that this theory has been quite successful in a clinical,

social and personological way, but not in a laboratory and experimental

way. It has fitted very well with the personal experience of most people,

and has often given them a structured theory that has helped them to

make better sense of their inner lives. It seems for most people to have a

direct, personal, subjective plausibility. And yet i! still lacks experimental

verification and support. I have not yet been able to think of a good way

to put it to the test in the laboratory.

Part of the answer to this puzzle came from Douglas McGregor (332),

who applied this theory of motivation to the industrial situation. Not

only did he find it useful in ordering his data and his observations, but

also these data served retroactively as a source of validation and verifica-

tion for the theory. It is from this area, rather than from the lahoratory,

that empirical support is now coming. (The Bibliography contains a

sampling of such reports.)

The lesson I had learned from this and from subsequent validation

from other areas of life was this: when we talk about the needs of human

beings, we talk about the essence of their lives. How could I have thought

that this essence could be put to the test in some animal laboratory or

some test tube situation? Obviously it needs a life situation of the total

human being in his social environment. This is where confirmation or

disconfirmation will come from.

Chapter 4 betrays its clinical-therapeutic origins by its stress on neurosis'

producers rather than on motivations which do not make trouble [or

the psychotherapist, e.g., inertia and laziness, sensory pleasures, and. the

need for sensory stimulations and for activity, the sheer zest for life, or

the lack of it, the proneness to hope or to hopelessness, the tendency 10

regress more or less easily under fear, anxiety, scarcity, etc., not to mention

the highest human values which arc also motivators: beauty, truth, excel·

l~nce, completion, justice, order, consistency, harmony, etc.

These necessary complements to Chapters 3 and 4 are discussed in

Chaplers 3, 4, and 5 of my Toward a Psychology of Being (295), in the

chapter on Lower Grumbles, Higher Grumbles and Metagrumbles in my

Eupsychian Management (291), and in A Theory of Metamotivation: the

Biological Rooting of the Value-Life (314).

Human life will never be understood unless its highest aspirations

are taken into account. Growth, self-actualization, the striving toward

health, the quest for identity and autonomy. the yearning for excellence

(and other ways of phrasing the striving "upward") must by now be

Preface

xiii

accepted beyond <Iuestion as a widespread and perhaps universal human

tendency.

And yet there are also other regressive, fearful, self-diminishing

tendencies as well. and it is very easy to forget them in our intoxication

with "personal growth," especially for inexperienced youngsters. I con-

sider that a necessary prophylactic against such illusions is a thorough

knowledge o{ psychopathology and of depth psychology. We must appre-

ciate that many people choose the worse rather than the better, that

growth is often a painful process and may for this reason be shunned,

that we are afraid of our own best possibilities in addition to loving them

(314) and that we are all of us profoundly ambivalent about truth.

heauty, virtue. loving them and fearing them too (295). Freud is still

required reading for the humanistic psychologist (his {acts, not his meta-

physics). I should like also to recommend an extraordinarily sensitive

book by Hoggart (196) which will certainly help us to understand com-

passionately the pull toward the vulgar, the trivial, the cheap and the

fake in the less educated people he writes about.

Chapter 4, and Chapter 6 on "The Instinctoid Nature of Basic Needs,"

constitute for me the foundation of a system of intrinsic human values,

human goods that validate themselves, that are intrinsically good and

desirable and that need no further justification. This is a hierarchy of

values which are to be found in the very ~ssence of human nature itself.

These are not only wanted and desired by all human heings, but also

needed in the sense that they are necessary to avoid illness .and psycho-

pathology. To say

.th~! si,l,ne thing in another vocabulary, the.se basic

needs and the metaneeds (314) are also the intrinsic reinforcers, the un-

conditioned stimuli which can be used as a basis upon which can be

erecte~1 ,all,lso.n~ ,?~; in~fr!~lryl~l\W} I\~arniljl~t:,!-nd conditionings. That is to

say that in ordeqq ~~t fPA~e),ntrj.';l,sicgooos;'animais and men are willing

to learn practically "a~y.t!ling that will achieve for them these ultimate

goods.

".

I want to be sure to mention 'here, even though I do not have the

space for expanding upon the idea, that it is legitimate and fruitful to

regard instinctoid basic needs and the metaneeds as rights as well as

needs. This follows immediately upon granting that human beings have

a right to be human in the same sense that cats have a right to be cats.

In. order to be fully human, these need and metaneed gratifications are

necessary. and may therefore be considered to be natural rights.

The hierarchy of needs and metaneeds has been helpful to me in another

way. 1 find that it serves as a kind of smorgasbord table from which peo-

xiv

Preface

pie can choose in accordance with their own tastes and appetites. That is

to say, that in any judging of the motivations Cor a person's behavior, the

character of the judge also has to be taken into account. He chooses

the motivations to which he wiII attribute the behavior. Cor instance, in

accord with his generalized optimism or pessimism. I find

the latter

choice to be made Car more frequently today. so frequently that 1 find

it useful to name the phenomenon "downlevelling- of the motivations."

Briefly put, this is the tendency to prefer, for explanatory purposes. the

lower needs to the middle needs. and the middle needs to the higher. A

purely materialistic motivation is preferred to a social or metamotivated

one. or to a mixture of all three. It is a kind of paranoid.like suspicion,

a form of devaluation of human nature, which I see often but which. to

my knowledge, has not been sufficiently described. I think that any com-

plete theory of motivation must

inclH~e this additional variable.

And of course I am sure that the historian of ideas would find it very

easy to find many cxamples, in different culLllres and in different times.

of either a general trend to downlevcIling or uplcvelling of human mo-

tivations. At the moment of writing. the trend in our cultme is very

clearly toward widespread downleveIling. The lower needs are being

heavily overused for explanatory purposes and the higher and metaneeds

are being badly undcrused. In my opinion this tendency rcsts far more

on preconception than an empirical fact. I find' the higher needs and

metaneeds to be far more determinativc than my suhje(:ts thcmselves

suspect. and certainly far. far more than contemporary ilUcIlcctuals dare '

admit. Obviously, this is an empirical and scientific question, and just

as obviously it is far too important a matter to be left to cliques and

in·groups.

I had added to Chapter 5 on gratification theory a section on the patlwl.

ogy of gratification. Cenainly this is something that we were not prepared

for fifteen or twenty years ago. that pathological consequences might

ensue after having attained what one had been tryinK to attain. and

which was supposed to hring happiness. W'e have learned with Oscar

\Vilde to beware of what we wish-for the tragedy may come about that

Olll" wishes may be g-ranted. This seems to be possible at any of the mo·

th'ational levels. whether the material, or the interpersonal. or the

transcendent.

\Ve can learn from this unexpected finding that the gratification of

the basic needs does not in itself automatically bring ahout a system of

values in which to belicve and to which onc may commit himself. Rather,

we have learned that one of the possible consequenccs of basic need

Prf'!ace

xv

gratifications may be boredom, aimlessness, anomie and the like. Appar-

enLly we function best when we are striving for something that we lack,

when we wish for something that we do not have, and when we organize

our powers in the service of striving toward the gratification of that wish.

The state of gratification turns out to be not necessarily a state of guar-

anteed happiness or contentment. It is a moot state, one that raises

problems as well as solving problems.

This discovery implies that for many people the only definition of

the meaningful life that they can think of is "to be lacking something

essential and to be striving for it." But we know that self-actualizing

people, e\'Cn though all their basic needs have already heen gratified,

find life to he even morc richly meaningful because they can live, so to

speak, in the realm of Being (295). The ordinary, widespread philosophy

of a meaningful life is, therefore, a mistaken one, or at least an imma-

ture one.

.lust as important for me has been the growing realization of what I

t1ave been calling Grumble Theory (291). In brief, what I have observed

is that need gratifications lead to only temporary happiness which in

tllrn tends to be succeeded by another and (hopefully) higher discontent.

It looks as jf rhe human hope for eternal happiness can never be fulfilled.

Certainly happiness does come and is obtainahle and is real. But it looks

as if we must accept its intrinsic transience, especially if we focus on its

more intense forms. Peak experiences do not last, and cannot last. Intense

happiness is episodic, not continuous.

But this amounts to a revision of the theory of happiness that has

ruled liS for three thousand years and that has determined our concepts

of heaven, of the Garden of Eden, of the guod life, the good society, the

good person. Our love stories have traditionally ended "And they lived

happily ever after." And so also have our theories of social improvement

and social revolution. So also, for instance, have we been over-sold-and

consequently disillusioned-by the very real though limited improve-

. ments in our society. 'Ve were over-sold on the benefits of labor union-

ism, of women's suffrage, of the direct election of Senators, of °the graded

income tax, and of many other improvements that we have built into,

e.g., the amendments to th'e Constitution. Each one of them was supposed

to bring a millenium, eternal happiness, the final solution of all prol>-

lems. The result has tended to be disillusionment after the fact. Hut

disillusionment means that there had been illusions. And this seems to

be the clear point to make, that we may reasonably expect improvements

xvi

Preface

to take place. But we can no longer reasonably expect perfection to come

to pass, or permanent happiness to be achieved.

I must call attention also to what has been overlooked almost universally

even though now it seems very obvious,

name~y that the blessi ...

摘要

《动机与人格》是亚伯拉罕·马斯洛于1954年首次出版的心理学著作，1970年进行了修订。这本书试图通过探索人类"更高层次"的本性来扩展对人格的理解，提出了一种全新的人性观。马斯洛认为，除了当时心理学对人性的理解外，人还拥有一种本能性的"更高本性"。

马斯洛在序言中解释，他的理论建立在现有心理学基础上，但提出了不同的人性哲学。他的动机理论（第3-7章）整合了弗洛伊德、阿德勒、荣格等人的部分真理，形成了需求层次理论。这一理论在临床和社会层面取得了成功，但缺乏实验验证。

书中强调人类基本需求的满足是避免疾病和心理病理的必要条件，这些需求构成了内在人类价值体系的基础。马斯洛还指出需求满足的病理学，即达到所追求的目标后可能出现的病理后果，如无聊和无目的感。他提出"抱怨理论"，认为需求满足只带来暂时的幸福，随后会出现更高层次的不满，表明人类对永恒幸福的希望无法实现。

本书代表了一种新的"人本主义"世界观，对人性、社会和价值观提出了更为希望和鼓舞人心的理解方式。

与问题相关的信息提取

在提供的网页内容中，我只看到了《动机与人格》的目录和序言部分，而没有看到第四章的具体内容。根据目录，第四章的标题是"A Theory of Human Motivation"（人类动机理论），但网页内容中并未包含该章节的正文。

序言中，马斯洛提到他的动机理论最初于1942年提出，是一种整合弗洛伊德、阿德勒、荣格等人部分真理的理论结构。他的理论关注基本需求的层次结构，这些需求构成了内在人类价值体系的基础。马斯洛认为这些基本需求是人类本质的一部分，是避免疾病和心理病理的必要条件。

然而，在提供的内容中，没有找到关于"自我实现"(self-actualization)的具体定义，也没有找到"a musician must make music"或"What a man can be, he must be"这两句话的原文上下文。虽然目录中提到第11章是关于"Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health"（自我实现的人：心理健康研究），但网页内容中并未包含该章节。

因此，在提供的网页内容中，没有与要探究的问题直接相关的信息。要找到马斯洛如何定义"自我实现"以及这两句引述的上下文，需要查看第四章和第十一章的具体内容。

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网页内容摘要

这篇文章是Janet B. Dean于1996年在阿斯伯里神学院(Asbury Theological Seminary)提交的硕士论文，题为《马斯洛的自我实现理论与圣经神学和基督教咨询的关系》。论文旨在通过圣经视角审视马斯洛的自我实现理论，并确定其对当代基督教咨询的相关性。

论文分为五章：第一章探讨马斯洛的生平及其对自我实现理论的影响；第二章概述马斯洛的心理学和自我实现理论；第三章从圣经和神学角度检验马斯洛的理论；第四章讨论马斯洛理论对当代基督教咨询的启示；第五章总结马斯洛理论与圣经神学和基督教咨询的关系。

作者在导言中指出，马斯洛作为人本主义心理学的主要创始人之一，其自我实现理论在过去40年中对心理学、教育、管理、社会学、人类学和神学等多个学科产生了重大影响。尽管马斯洛的理论在世俗心理学和某些神学观点中很突出，但在基督教咨询领域却很少受到关注。作者回顾了相关文献，包括马斯洛的传记资料、自我实现理论的概述、相关研究以及从圣经角度对马斯洛理论的批评，并指出虽然大多数保守的基督徒因其强烈的人本主义焦点而拒绝自我实现理论，但一些研究表明马斯洛的理论可能对圣经基督教有所启示。

与问题相关的信息提取

在这篇论文中，虽然网页内容主要是论文的前言和目录部分，但它提供了一些关于马斯洛自我实现理论的背景信息。根据内容，马斯洛的自我实现理论是他对人性的整体理解的尝试，这一理论在过去40年中对多个学科产生了重大影响。

关于"自我实现"的定义，网页内容中没有直接提供马斯洛在《动机与人格》(Motivation and Personality)中的具体定义。文中提到马斯洛的著作《动机与人格》，但没有详细引述其中对自我实现的定义。

关于"a musician must make music"这句话，在提供的网页内容中没有出现这个引述或其上下文。这句话很可能出现在论文的第二章（"马斯洛的心理学：自我实现"）或其他未在当前网页中显示的部分。

值得注意的是，文中提到马斯洛的理论包含"高峰体验"(peak experiences)的概念，这被认为是自我实现者的一个特征。文中也提到一些研究者认为，一旦移除马斯洛理论中对自我的强烈关注，他的自我实现理想可以与基督教的完美相比较。

总体而言，虽然网页内容提供了马斯洛自我实现理论的研究背景和框架，但没有直接回答关于马斯洛如何定义"自我实现"或"a musician must make music"这句话的完整上下文的问题。

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摘要

这篇文章分析了亚伯拉罕·马斯洛的人类动机理论，特别是他的需求层次理论和自我实现概念。文章首先介绍了人本主义心理学运动的背景，马斯洛是该运动的重要人物。马斯洛的需求层次理论包括五个层次：生理需求、安全需求、归属与爱的需求、尊重需求和自我实现需求。文章详细阐述了每一层次的特点，特别是自我实现作为最高层次的需求。马斯洛认为，人类动机是由这些基本需求的满足程度决定的，较低层次的需求得到满足后，更高层次的需求会随之出现。文章还探讨了飞利浦设计哲学如何应用马斯洛的理论来理解社会文化变化中出现的新心理需求，并通过技术实现这些需求的满足。最后，文章将马斯洛的需求层次理论视为一个积极的设计模型，用于理解和满足当代社会中的人类需求。

与问题相关的信息提取

在网页内容中，我找到了关于马斯洛自我实现定义的重要信息，位于第11页的"The Need for Self-actualization"部分。根据文章内容，马斯洛将自我实现定义为人类需求层次的最高层次，是在生理需求、安全需求、归属与爱的需求以及尊重需求都得到基本满足后才会出现的需求。

关于"a musician must make music..."这句话的上下文，文章中确实提到了这段引述。马斯洛认为，即使一个人的所有基本需求都得到满足，如果他没有做自己适合做的事情，仍然会感到不安和不满足。他表达了这样的观点：音乐家必须创作音乐，艺术家必须绘画，诗人必须写作，如果他们要最终与自己和平相处的话。一个人能成为什么样的人，他就必须成为什么样的人。这表明自我实现是关于个人潜能的充分发挥，是人类内在本质的表达。

马斯洛认为自我实现是一种成长动机，而非缺乏动机。与其他基本需求不同，自我实现需求不是因为缺乏某些东西而产生的，而是个体追求成长、发展和实现潜能的内在驱动力。自我实现的人往往具有特定的特征，如对现实的清晰认知、问题中心化而非自我中心化、对隐私的需求、自主性、持续的新鲜感欣赏、神秘体验、对人类的认同感、深刻而非表面的人际关系、民主性格结构、区分手段和目的的能力、哲学式的幽默感、创造力以及对文化的抵抗。

马斯洛的这一理论强调了人类追求自我实现的内在驱动力，以及这种驱动力如何促使人们充分发挥自己的潜能和才能。

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